Critique of Halakhic reason: divine commandments and social normativity
"The proper object for philosophical inquiry is not the rational permissibility of Jewish practices but the normative claim of the commandments. This was recognized by modern philosophers of halakhah, chief among them Joseph Soloveitchik. In the previous section, I noted that Rynhold reads Solo...
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| Kaituhi rangatōpū: | |
| Hōputu: | Print Pukapuka |
| Reo: | English |
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| WorldCat: | WorldCat |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| I whakaputaina: |
New York, NY
Oxford University Press
[2024]
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| In: | Year: 2024 |
| Rangatū: | Reflection and theory in the study of religion
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Halacha
/ Jüdische Philosophie
/ Religionsphilosophie
/ Soloṿeyṭshiḳ, Yosef Dov 1903-1993
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism BH Judaism |
| Further subjects: | B
Commandments (Judaism)
B Soloveitchik, Joseph Dov (1903-1993) Philosophy |
| Urunga tuihono: |
Table of Contents Inhaltsverzeichnis (Aggregator) Blurb Literaturverzeichnis |
| Whakarāpopototanga: | "The proper object for philosophical inquiry is not the rational permissibility of Jewish practices but the normative claim of the commandments. This was recognized by modern philosophers of halakhah, chief among them Joseph Soloveitchik. In the previous section, I noted that Rynhold reads Soloveitchik as offering a non-foundationalist justification of Jewish practice. In this chapter, I argue that while rejecting reason as their source, Soloveitchik is a foundationalist who grounds the normativity of the commandments in metaphysically real values. These values justify the commandments both by anchoring them in reality and by providing a purpose for their performance. The commandments are a discipline for achieving appropriate emotional and behavioral responses to these real values. Moreover, values guide the implementation of the commandments because the exemplary decisor has been so shaped by this discipline that his rulings are intuitively guided by them. Taken together, I argue, Soloveitchik's account of halakhic practice, authority, and ruling amounts to a virtue ethics and jurisprudence grounded in a realist axiology. This is a new interpretation of Soloveitchik's philosophy of halakhah. It is supported by unearthing oft-neglected intellectual influences and by drawing on a broad range of his writings. Most important for my purposes, it presents a coherent view on the source of normativity for the commandments and the relation between their justification and jurisprudence: they are grounded in values that also guide their implementation. Still, I contend, Soloveitchik's ontology and epistemology of value are implausible, and his rejection of reason is overstated. Moreover, though his virtue ethics perhaps presents a compelling image of Jewish practice, his virtue jurisprudence fosters relationships of domination between halakhic decisors and their followers"-- |
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| Whakaahutanga tūemi: | Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 329-350 |
| Whakaahuatanga ōkiko: | xiv, 362 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 0197767931 |