The Law of Ritual Slaughter and the Principle of Religious Equality

In December 2014, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal struck down as unconstitutional a statute that prohibited all animal slaughter conducted without prior stunning. The Tribunal found this law contrary to Polish (and European) provisions regarding freedom of exercise of religion. In the present pap...

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Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Gliszczyńska-Grabias, Aleksandra (Συγγραφέας)
Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Sadurski, Wojciech 1950-
Τύπος μέσου: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο
Γλώσσα:Αγγλικά
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Έκδοση: 2016
Στο/Στη: Journal of law, religion and state
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 4, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 233-266
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά:B religious equality ritual slaughter European Court of Human Rights freedom of religion Constitutional Tribunal Poland United States public morals
Διαθέσιμο Online: Volltext (Verlag)
Παράλληλη έκδοση:Μη ηλεκτρονικά
Περιγραφή
Σύνοψη:In December 2014, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal struck down as unconstitutional a statute that prohibited all animal slaughter conducted without prior stunning. The Tribunal found this law contrary to Polish (and European) provisions regarding freedom of exercise of religion. In the present paper, we critically analyze the judgment through the lens of the general principle of religious equality. Considering other European cases involving ritual slaughter, as well as a landmark us case on the matter, we propose a template for the discussion of equality in religious matters, based on a distinction between two formulas: “substantive” equality, which requires accommodation of religious requirements and often calls for exemptions from general rules; and “formal” equality, which calls for the equal application of general moral standards to all religious and non-religious practices. We conclude that a “formal” conception is also based on substantive moral considerations about the priority of some general moral requirements over those demanded by particular religious practices.
Φυσική περιγραφή:Online-Ressource
ISSN:2212-4810
Περιλαμβάνει:In: Journal of law, religion and state
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22124810-00403001